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Abstract 
The background to this paper is the introduction of public access IT facilities in public 
libraries. These facilities have seen recorded instances of misuse alongside weaknesses 
in checking identities of users and in explaining Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) to 
users. The FRILLS (Forensic Readiness of Local Libraries in Scotland) project, funded 
by the Scottish Library and Information Council, attempted to survey the situation in 
Scottish public libraries and develop a forensic readiness logging regime for use in them. 
There is in depth discussion of the use of logging in public library computer facilities. 
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1. Introduction 
The answer to the question posed by this paper is: your local public library - hence the 
‘Shush’ clue, which is the stereotypical warning most often issued against bad behaviour 
in a library. Public libraries are usually seen as oases of peace and quiet, where one 
reads the local newspaper, scours the returned books trolley for popular local reads, and 
researches family history or an assignment for school or college. They have not been 
seen as providing a channel for bad behaviour on the Internet. 
The services public libraries offer have been updated in line with the growth of the 
Internet. Back in the 19th century, when public libraries began, they were seen as ‘street 
corner universities’, providing access for all to a wide range of published content. In the 
late 1990s, because of the rise of the Internet, public libraries were given public access 
computers, which could be used for tasks like word processing, but were increasingly 
used for Internet access. In the UK free public access to IT facilities was enshrined in the 
development of the ‘Peoples Network’, the brand name chosen for the startup round of 
funding. The ‘Peoples Network’ project has been evaluated and was found to have been 
a vital element in addressing the ‘digital divide’ in society by offering IT facilities to those 
that did not have them at home. In all developed countries, a significant part of the 
population (around 25%) has no computer/Internet access at home or work. This figure 
does not seem to be decreasing.(1,2) 
Access to a computer in a public library is usually free, although demand may require 
advance booking. One normally needs to be a member of the public library, that is 
possess a library card. When signing on, one is asked to read an acceptable use policy 
(AUP), normally couched in the form of a contract, and one must accept that AUP, by 
clicking a button, to use any public library computer. The AUP is presented to a user 
each time they logon. A standard AUP will set out legal requirements for proper 
computer use and also possibly local requirements: for example chat sites might be 
ruled out as their use is seen as a waste of a limited public resource. AUPs are normally 
enforced by observation of user activities by library staff, either by shoulder surfing or 
screen shadowing using packages like NetLoan. Public libraries are ultimately controlled 
by local Councils, so their computer facilities are normally run by Council IT 
departments. These departments normally impose a level of filtering, blocking certain 
sites from Council employees and, by extension, members of the public using computers 
in public libraries. Finally, computers in libraries are normally set up to erase or hide 
each user’s activities from other users. Librarians, following on from the tradition of 
offering user privacy by not making available book loan records, do not make available 
any logs of user sessions on their public access computers either. This is seen as an 
ethical imperative and part of professional practice. 
However, it might be assumed that there is consistency in IT access procedures in 
public libraries across the UK, as well as consistent application of AUPs and consistent 
and visible policies about Internet filtering. These assumptions were investigated by a 
small research project, ‘Open Gateway or Guarded Fortress’, which was the recipient of 
the 2006 Elsevier/Library and Information Research Group Award (3). This project 
utilised ‘mystery shopping’ testing and visited 14 different UK library authorities (eight 
English; four Scottish; two Welsh).  Where possible neighbouring libraries were visited; 
the hypothesis being that two libraries that were close but under a different local 
authority control could conceivably be visited by the same people and thus any 
differences in service would be noticeable to the users. The same researcher visited all 
14 libraries, and the scenario given was that he was not a library member but wished to 
access his email using the library computers. The researcher had no means of proving 
his address or identity, carrying only credit and charge cards, as would most people.   
While all libraries visited found staff to be extremely helpful, even when access to the 
Internet was denied, there were occasions when the desire to be helpful was potentially 
allowing anonymous Internet use. Only two of the 14 libraries visited refused access. 
However one of these libraries would have happily accepted a bill or official letter as 
evidence of address, so successful ‘dumpster diving’ could have resulted in access. 
Only one pair of libraries offered exactly the same access provisions/AUPs. In only one 
of the 12 libraries where access was granted did the staff make any attempt to explain 
their AUP. Indeed, in two of the 12 libraries staff helpfully logged the researcher on to a 
computer, thus bypassing the AUP!  
While this survey revealed that access control was weak, it did not investigate its 
potential consequences nor possible solutions. Some consequences were known from 
local experience. For example, apparently searching in Polish would get around filters 
obscene blocking sites in public libraries in Glasgow, while public library computers in 
West Lothian were used in a fraudulent online purchase of goods discovered during a 
police investigation. There are docmented instances of serious misuse. For example, in 
August 2005, Richard Wartnaby was convicted for downloading nearly 1000 indecent 
photographs of children in Earlston public library.(4) 
Whilst this instance was discovered, many other types of misuse of library IT facilities for 
hi-tech crime - hacking, identify theft, phishing scams, etc. – may not be. This problem 
led to the FRILLS project (Forensic Readiness for Local Libraries in Scotland) which was 
funded by the Scottish Library and Information Council (SLIC) as a part of its 2007 
Innovation and Development Fund round of funded projects. The project recognised that 
whilst library IT facilities are protected and configured with content filters they are not 
able to record crime. The term ‘forensic readiness’ (FR) describes the technical 
preparedness for computer investigation in anticipation of a crime. Successful FR would 
also need suitable staff training and management procedures for routine examination, 
incident reporting and elevation to enable the proactive seeking out of misuse. Thus 
FRILLS was to investigate FR for public libraries. 
The aims of the FRILLS Project (http://frills.cis.strath.ac.uk) were: 
- To create a typology of computer crimes committed on public access computer 
facilities in general and public library based facilities in Scotland in particular. 
- To specify a flexible FR regime which fits the needs and constraints imposed by 
a variety of library ICT facilities  
- To develop management procedures and staff guidelines which will 
activate/review/terminate FR activity in response to incidents/random 
checks/regular audits, satisfying privacy legislation and reporting findings to the 
appropriate external authorities 
- To produce a training pack with materials for implementing FR regimes and 
requisite management policies and guidelines for their use 
The remainder of this paper will explore the methodologies used to achieve these aims 
and the products and outcomes of the FRILLS Project. 
 
2. Computer crime in Scottish public libraries  
A detailed, focussed review of the literature on computer crime conducted through public 
access machines was carried out. Not just academic journals were searched but also 
publications of the various professional library associations (e.g. CILIP, the Chartered 
Institute of Library and Information Professionals in the UK, ALA, the American Library 
Association) and general newspapers (e.g. The Times, The Guardian etc). The intention 
behind widening the search was to pick up as many examples as possible. There 
seemed no rationale to restrict the search just to Scottish examples, as location has no 
effect on computer crime, although Scottish examples were actively sought. Finally, 
cybercafés were also seen as a potential route for misuse that could be echoed in public 
libraries and these were included in the literature search. 
To supplement the literature review, two online surveys were carried out of Heads of 
Library Service and of library staff in Scottish public libraries. Both surveys contained 
similar questions, looking at the effectiveness of AUPs, experience of misuse, how it had 
been dealt with, and whether training in detection and misuse reporting had been given. 
Opinions on the FRILLS Project were also sought. As well as these surveys, four Library 
authorities (Falkirk, Fife. Perth, Renfrewshire) volunteered to participate as potential trial 
sites, and a selection of library staff at these sites were interviewed, using questions 
derived from the online questionnaires. 
The literature review found substantial evidence of misuse of public library computer 
facilities, typically involving pornography or child pornography.  Misuse in cybercafés 
exhibited a very similar profile to that of misuse in public libraries. For example, the 
EasyInternet cyber café in the centre of Glasgow had been used by a customer to 
distribute child pornography [ref5]. There were other forms of misuse. For example, 
EasyInternet cyber cafés had also been sued for £210,000 for allowing customers to 
download music illegally [ref6].  
The detection and resolution of misuse had caused instances of severe stress for library 
staff involved. For example, in a Welsh library a staff member had been sacked for 
refusing to serve a user who had served a ban for viewing pornography [ref7]. An 
ongoing case in the United States involves a probationary staff member being sacked for 
giving police the name of a user allegedly viewing pornography, after being told to follow 
library procedures first. The user was a person with a very low educational level who 
may not have been aware of the nature of his actions [ref8]. 
The surveys/interviews carried out in Scotland echoed the literature. While serious 
incidents were very rare, there were reported instances of misuse, for example 
unsavoury use of chat/Bebo, letterhead forgery and a minor using a purloined adult 
library card to access unsuitable material, among others. Library staff found checking for 
misuse, and dealing with it, extremely unpleasant. All used methods to lock down 
machines and many had means of remote viewing of user screens. While procedures 
were in place, some staff perceived differences in their application between different 
libraries (e.g. in obtaining witness statements) and many wanted more training in this 
area. There seemed to be no central monitoring of abuse: thus someone banned in one 
area could potentially shift activity to another. 
All libraries surveyed used an acceptable use policy. However these had diverged over 
time from a core model provided when the People’s Network was rolled out. Effort 
therefore had to be expended in duplicating similar updating efforts in other authorities. 
A minority of responders said that users got no explanation of the AUP. This would be a 
breach of proper protocol. Others responded that the legalese used in AUPs was 
impenetrable, especially to users for whom English was not their first language. Many 
responders thought that AUPs were too easily ignored. In general, surveyed library staff, 
though wary of misuse and supportive of a logging system which would make monitoring 
more effective and easier, were extremely concerned that users not be put off by any 
use of logging software. Privacy of library users was held to be paramount.  
 
3. A flexible forensic readiness tool for public libraries 
A survey of public library IT managers was attempted but got one response! The survey 
was lengthy as the intention was to gauge the range of deployment environments and 
the most commonly-used applications, so it might have put off would-be responders. 
Some Council IT operations were either outsourced, or in the process of being 
outsourced, which also did not help. There was no publicly-available overview of Council 
IT infrastructures. 
 Since all the volunteer trial sites used Windows XP, Explorer and Office, this was 
chosen as the target environment for the FR tool. As far as possible, programming was 
eschewed and re-use of existing facilities/software that recorded and analysed system 
activity, preferably free and open source (e.g. procmon for XP), was prioritised. 
Subsidiary objectives for the logging system were: 
1) To never record or log user passwords on any system/service 
2) To focus on browser logging but also cover chat 
3) To store logs in hashed, encrypted form 
4) To be able to defend logging activities against those with the expertise to subvert 
them 
5) To accommodate wifi, since libraries were thinking of offering wifi access 
6) To be usable ‘in reverse’ i.e. by those who wanted to ensure maximum user 
privacy by turning off any and all logging. 
XML was used to develop a structure for log files detailed enough for forensic records. 
Off the shelf packages and some written code were used to build a logging application 
called the Autonomous Logging Framework (ALF), shown in the diagram below. It 
creates an encrypted, authenticated XML record of a user session. There are 
implications for network traffic and long-term storage of these log records.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From interviews with library staff it become clear that IT Services provide the machines 
and networking for their public access IT, but provide it on their own terms. IT Services 
exist primarily to provide core systems support, and local IT resources, for Council 
functions and Council staff. Public access IT is very much a service ‘add-on’ and not a 
core offering. 
It proved possible to interview one group of Council IT staff. They appeared to be doing 
some logging of access for misuse checking themselves. However they were not willing 
to allow non-commercial software to be used on their networks. This refusal to allow use 
of non-standard software was also met at the other three sites. While this made project 
goals of deploying, testing and preparing training for logging software impossible, it 
perhaps reflected their caution about maintaining their service levels. It also proved 
impossible to set up a mock public library IT facility in our laboratory at the University. 
4. Discussion 
Although the logging software and architecture embodied in one potential output of 
FRILLS was not field tested as envisaged, the project itself discovered many flaws in the 
current system of provision of public access IT facilities in public libraries in Scotland, 
and, by extension, public libraries elsewhere in the UK and overseas. 
A standard procedure for dealing with misuse should be in place and supported by a set 
of training materials for public library staff. A listing of types and incidents of abuse 
should be maintained and updated, to spread awareness of new problems. A central 
listing of currently banned users should be maintained. Without this centralised system, 
the checking and reporting and punishment for computer misuse, will lack effectiveness. 
Even if ALF had been deployed throughout public libraries in Scotland, the lack of a 
centralised reporting and management structure would have severely undercut its 
effectiveness. 
The lack of one canonical AUP for all Scottish public libraries is also telling. One 
centrally-maintained AUP could be more easily updated over time as new problems or 
issues are discovered. The centralised incident list (proposed above) would help drive 
AUP content updating. Centralised) AUP provision would also enable the provision of 
the AUP in a variety of languages. Attention could also be directed at replacing the 
‘legalese’ currently used with much more plain language. Accessibility issues with a text-
only AUP could also be tackled by providing it in other media (e.g. as an MP3 file of 
spoken text). Finally, the need for user understanding of AUPs could be reinforced in 
staff training and also perhaps by extra software which would ‘pop up’ AUP-related 
questions during a user’s session to bring its restrictions to their attention. This software 
might upset library users intent on completing a task though, so should be used 
sparingly. 
Somewhat ironically, there was a general concern, noted above, that library users had a 
right to privacy when using the Internet. There are instances of papers in library-related 
journals, which give advice to librarians on how to remove typical records of activity, like 
URLs in a browser cache (refs 9, 10). However this advice does not go far enough. It 
fails to encompass the possibility of Internet activities being recorded outside of the 
immediate library environment, as user traffic in IP packets traverses the Internet. There 
ought to be advice available for library users on how to obtain private Internet access via 
anonymous proxies if they really want browsing to be hidden. There was no sign of 
encryption packages being offered to library computer users even though they were 
processing potentially personal data on a public machine in a public location. Generally 
there seems to be a lack of awareness of security issues amongst both library users and 
librarians: one interviewee related that a library user had been asking other people for 
help using a credit card with online shopping! Public libraries would be an ideal venue for 
imparting information about Internet security, which would tie in well with the ‘digital 
divide’ mission which originally inspired the introduction of public access computers in 
public libraries.  
If logging as performed by ALF was permitted in public libraries, it would add to the value 
of the public access IT facilities. The ‘Open Gateway or Guarded Fortress’ research 
report, covered above, revealed the need for, and tacit acceptance of, drop-in user 
access, whereby anybody, not just registered users of a particular library, could use its 
computer facilities. If all drop-in usage was logged, by ALF or an equivalent, then this 
would go a long way towards allowing secure, drop-in access. People really just wanting 
to check their email when away from home surely would not object to logging.  
There are other potential ‘positive’ applications of logging, where it allows extra facilities, 
rather than just being seen as a form of control. An example, mentioned above, is when 
a public library introduced wi-fi. Since this could be used outside of normal working 
hours and/or by library users who are not physically present and observable in a public 
library, then logging activity on these connections might be a sensible precaution. Some 
users may want a ‘logged’ option, a record of their activity, as it would prove what they 
did/did not do in a particular session. The functional diagram of ALF above, would need 
to be amended to allow for delivery of a log file to a user, as well as to the repository. 
Some form of external verification tool would also be needed. Finally, filtering (blocking) 
of certain Internet sites was also raised as a potential problem by the Open Gateway or 
Guarded Fortress’ research. If a connection was logged, then surely filtering could be 
turned off as there would be a record of sites the library user had looked it, meaning that 
any illegal sites the library user accessed, as opposed to those considered 
unacceptable, could be monitored. 
Finally, an issue that was raised in interviews with library staff was the unpleasantness, 
and personal risk involved, in confronting a library user suspected of misuse. Since 
many library staff are female and many library mis-users are male, such a confrontation 
becomes physically dangerous. Some female librarians may work shifts alone in a small 
public library, which only heightens the risks to them of confrontations over suspected 
misuse. Thus a logging tool could be used to avoid any confrontations by record 
suspicious use and then being used later in a more controlled environment to confront a 
user suspected of computer misuse. 
5. Conclusions 
We feel that we have opened up a potentially rich seam for research into computer 
misuse, of various types and severity, in public libraries. We suspect, but have not had 
the opportunity to prove, that hacking is going on. If technically-naïve users are trying to 
misuse library computers, trying to bypass filters, to download porn or MP3s, to borrow 
(or steal) a library card for a false identity, then surely professional hackers have 
cottoned on to the vulnerabilities in terms of identification and usage tracking that exist in 
public libraries. A related institution, cybercafés, offer very similar facilities to those in 
public libraries and we have already raised above serious incidents of misuse in 
cybercafés. In parts of the world not developed enough to have universal public library 
access, cybercafés fulfil a very important role in people’s lives, as many cybercafé users 
cannot afford any other form of Internet access. Future studies perhaps should tackle 
these different institutions together. 
Two related areas of research are the automatic analysis of logs and the effectiveness of 
any form of logging against an expert user. The first topic would be invaluable should 
logging get taken up generally in public libraries and/cybercafés. Even if logging is only 
used sparingly then automatic log analysis can remove (or reduce) the time consuming 
and unpleasant task of log analysis by a human. One feels that any deployment of 
logging in public computer facilities would be a target for certain elements. How well it 
would serve to dissuade or block those elements is unknown. 
We began this paper with a jocular reference to the image of the librarian. We now feel 
that the librarian image should change sharply, to accommodate new duties arising from 
the new computer facilities in libraries and the potential issues arising from their misuse. 
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